

AAR # 361-U

842-31

AFTER ACTION REPORT

60TH ARMED INF. BATTALION

9TH ARMORED DIVISION

OCT 44 thru MARCH 45

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THE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT SECTION, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION S-2,
BUILDING T-5 (T-1782).

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

CC "B" 9TH ARMD DIVISION

OCTOBER & NOVEMBER 1944

JANUARY & FEBRUARY 1945

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THE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT SECTION, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, S-2,
BUILDING T-5, (T-1782).

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

From: 200600 Oct 44
To : 312400 Oct 44

60th Armd Inf Bn.,
2 December 1944,
Heisacorf.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.
2. Maps - Trier, Sheet T-1, 1/100,000
3. Operations under following higher units -
 - a. 9th Armored Division - Maj Gen JOHN W. MONROE, Comag
CCA, 9th Armored Division - Colonel THOMAS S. HARROLD, Comag
 - b. Subordinate Units -
Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. WILLS, Comag
Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. SCHMIDT, Comag
Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt FLOYD D. WARDEN, Comag
Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt ROGER D. SHINN, Comag
Serv Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt LOUIS GIBLING, Comag
Med Det, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt STEPHEN E. GIBBS, Comag

Oct
44

Section II - Statistical Data.

1. Personnel losses.
 - a. Killed - none
 - b. Died of wounds - none
 - c. Wounded or injured - none
 - d. Missing - none
 - e. Captured - none
 - f. Sick or other non-battle injuries - 0 Off & 4 EM
2. Personnel replacements.
 - a. Actual replacements - 1 Off & 3 EM
 - b. Personnel returned to duty - none
3. PW's taken - none
4. Vehicular losses - none
5. Vehicular replacements - none
6. Ammunition expenditures - none

Section III - Narrative

1. The 60th Armored Infantry Battalion completed the last leg of its journey across France on 20th October 44. Arriving at the pre-designated bivouac in vicinity of Reis, Luxembourg at

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201250 October 4+, this Battalion reverted to command of CCA, 9th Armored Division.

2. Throughout the remainder of the period the Battalion occupied the afore mentioned bivouac performing bivouac security, routine training and duties. The necessary reconnaissance to carry out a pre-arranged counter-attack plan by CCA, 9th Armored Division in support of VIII Corps front line troops was performed at the beginning of the period. No enemy activity was encountered during this period.

Section IV - Comment.

1. No comment

Section V -

1. None

K. M. Collins
K. M. COLLINS,
Lt Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

From: 010100 Nov 44
To : 302400 Nov 44

60th Arm'd Inf Bn.,
5 December 1944,
Heisdorf.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.
2. Maps - Trier, Sheet T-1, 1/100,000
Wallendorf, Sheet 6105, 1/25,000
Neukirchen Ul, 1/100,000
3. Operations under following higher units -
 - a. 010100 Nov 44 - 020800 Nov 44 - 9th Armored Division,
Maj Gen JOHN W. LEONARD, Comdg
 - 010100 Nov 44 - 020800 Nov 44 - CCA, 9th Armored Division,
Col THOMAS J. HARROLD, Comdg
 - 020800 Nov 44 - 091230 Nov 44 - 8th Infantry Division
Maj Gen DONALD A. STROH, Comdg
 - 020800 Nov 44 - 091230 Nov 44 - 121st Infantry Regiment
Colonel JETER, Comdg
 - 091230 Nov 44 - 302400 Nov 44 - 9th Armored Division,
Maj Gen JOHN W. LEONARD, Comdg
 - 091230 Nov 44 - 302400 Nov 44 - CCA, 9th Armored Division,
Col THOMAS J. HARROLD, Comdg
 - b. Subordinate Units -
Hq Co, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. HALL, Comdg
Co A, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. SCHALLES, Comdg
Co B, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt FLOYD D. HARDER, Comdg
Co C, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt ROGER L. SHINN, Comdg
Serv Co, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt LOUIS GELLING, Comdg
Med Det, 60th Arm'd Inf Bn - Capt STEPHEN E. GATES, Comdg

Section II - Statistical Data -

1. Personnel losses.
 - a. Killed - none
 - b. Died of wounds - none
 - c. Wounded or injured - 0 Off 2 EM
 - d. Missing - none
 - e. Captured - none
 - f. Sick or other non-battle injuries - 1 Off 11 EM
2. Personnel replacements.
 - a. Actual replacements - 1 Off 14 EM
 - b. Personnel returned to duty - 0 Off 2 EM
3. PW's taken (2 Nov 44 only) - 2
4. Vehicular losses - none
5. Vehicular replacements - none

6. Ammunition expenditure:

Type	Caliber	No. Rds
Machine Gun	80	1,500
SMG	45	100
H.E. Mortar	60 mm	683
Illuminous Mortar	60 mm	36
H.E. Light Mortar	81 mm	133
H.E. Heavy Mortar	81 mm	157
W. P. Smoke Mortar	81 mm	111
H.E. How (M 48 w/M48 fuse)	75 mm	30
H.E. How (M 48 w/M54 fuse)	75 mm	52
Fragmentation, hand	Grenade	532

Section III - Narrative

At the beginning of the period the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion was in bivouac in vicinity of Fels, Luxembourg (see attached overlay #1, Section V) making preparations to relieve the 1st Bn, 121st Inf Regt., 8th Infantry Division. Effective 020800 Nov 44 relief of the 1st Bn of the 121st Inf Regt began and troops of the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion were transported by trucks to that sector, leaving the major portion of the organic transportation in the former bivouac. The relief of the 1st Bn, 121st Inf Regt was completed 021050 Nov 44 with our troops in position as shown on attached overlay #2, Section V.

The enemy dispositions throughout the period 021050 Nov 44 to 091250 Nov 44 were as shown in attached overlay #2, Section V and his activity was confined to defensive operations, three confirmed patrols and light harassing artillery fire.

The enemy strength in the immediate sector was estimated about 400, with an apparent lack of supplies. Judging from the interrogation of PW's captured in this vicinity the morale was considered to be fair and the lower ranks had little or no knowledge of their own or our situation. Two Polish deserters stated that they were the last of the foreign element in their company and only a few remained in the others.

The weather, because of much fog and rain, greatly limited observation and the possibility of larger operations by the enemy.

The terrain was such as afforded us the advantage. The Our River ran between the two lines with the high ground on either side occupied by the opposing forces. The Our River can easily be forded. The ground to immediate front was high and not easily accessible to vehicles but to the right flank was low rolling ground running to Bollindorf and with roads leading East through the hills. On the West flank the hills fell away and from Wallendorf the terrain opened up in a gradual rise to the East. This is apparently good tank country, open and not heavily wooded. Enemy air activity was limited to one strafing attack over our area. The mission for this period was to occupy and defend the sector as shown on overlay #2, Section V.

Our operations were confined to the occupation and defense of the sector and the routine defensive firing of mortar and assault guns and the dispatching of numerous small patrols with reconnaissance and ambush missions.

This Battalion successfully defended the assigned sector, which was not subject to enemy attack, until relieved by the 1st Bn, 121st Inf Regt, 091230 Nov 44.

Confirmed enemy casualties for the period: one (1) killed and two (2) captured.

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Upon being relieved by the 1st Bn, 121st Inf Regt., the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion assembled in the former bivouac area in vicinity of Fels, Luxembourg (See overlay #1, Section V)

Throughout the remainder of the month the Battalion performed routine training and duties.

Beginning on the 19 November 44, because of the increasing inclemency of the weather, an endeavor was made to house the maximum number of troops in billets and the end of the month found the Battalion located as shown on overlay #3, Section V.

Section IV - No comment.

K. W. Collins

K.W. COLLINS,
Lt Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT


From: 010100 Dec 44
To : 312400 Dec 44

60th Armd Inf Bn,
10 January 1945,
France.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.
2. Maps - Trier, Sheet T-1, 1/100,000
Neukirchen, Sheet U1, 1/100,000
Wallendorf, Sheet 6103, 1/25,000
Bastogne, Sheet 121, 1/50,000
Bastogne, NE, Sheet 121, 1/25,000
3. Operations under following higher units -
 - a. 010100 Dec 44 - 221100 Dec 44 - 9th Armored Division,
Maj Gen JOHN W. LEONARD, Commanding,
221100 Dec 44 - 261400 Dec 44 - 10th Armored Division,
Maj Gen WILLIAM MORRIS, Commanding,
261400 Dec 44 - 291800 Dec 44 - 4th Armored Division,
Maj Gen HUGH J. GAFFNEY, Commanding,
291800 Dec 44 - 300600 Dec 44 - 9th Armored Division,
Maj Gen JOHN W. LEONARD, Commanding,
300600 Dec 44 - 312400 Dec 44 - 8th Corps, 3rd U.S. Army,
Maj Gen TROY MIDDLETON, Commanding.
 - b. Subordinate Units -
010100 Dec 44 - 181000 Dec 44 - Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn,
Capt JOHN W. HALL, Commanding,
181000 Dec 44 - 312400 Dec 44 - Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn,
1st Lt LEO J. GRAHAM, Commanding,
Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. SCHALLES, Comdg
Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt FLOYD D. HARDER, Comdg
010100 Dec 44 - 180700 Dec 44 - Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn,
Capt ROGER L. SHINN, Commanding,
180700 Dec 44 - 312400 Dec 44 - Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn,
1st Lt CLIFFORD E. PENROSE, Commanding,
Service Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn, - Capt LOUIS GELLING, Comdg,
Med Det, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt STEPHEN E. GATES, Comdg.



609-70.2

Section II - Statistical Data -

1. Personnel losses.
 - a. Killed - 1 Off & 63 EM
 - b. Died of wounds - 0 Off & 1 EM
 - c. Wounded or injured - 4 Off & 156 EM
 - d. Missing - 4 Off & 141 EM
 - e. Captured - 0 Off & 2 EM
 - f. Sick or other non-battle injuries - 3 Off & 117 EM
2. Personnel replacements.
 - a. Actual replacements - 0 Off & 2 EM
 - b. Personnel returned to duty - 2 Off & 10 EM
3. PW's taken - 518
4. Vehicular losses -

9987

8 ea $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck 4x4
 1 ea $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck 4x4 w/c w/w
 1 ea $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck 6x6 w/w
 3 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck, large 6x6
 8 ea Half-tracks M3
 6 ea Half-tracks M3A1
 1 ea Assault Gun 75 mm How M8
 5 ea Trailers, 1 ton cargo
 2 ea Trailers, M10

5. Vehicular replacements -

6 ea $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks 4x4
 1 ea $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck 6x6
 2 ea Half-tracks M2
 2 ea Half-tracks M3

6. Ammunition expenditure:

Type	No. Rds
Grenades, rifle	240
Grenades, Hd frag.	3365
Carbine, cal .30	69000
Rifle, cal .30 M1 8/c	87000
Rifle, cal .30 O3 5/c	480
Cal .45 M1911	58000
Machine Gun, cal .30	118000
Machine Gun, cal .50	18000
60 mm H.E.	670
81 mm H.E. Hv	54
81 mm H.E. Lt	380
81 mm Smk	17
75 mm How, M48 M48	275
75 mm How, M48 M54	68
75 mm How, H.E. AT	280
Rocket, M9	289

Section III - Narrative

From the 1-9 Dec 44, the 60th Armd Inf Bn was assigned to CCA, 9th AD. During this period the unit was not in contact with the enemy. Approximately half of the unit was in tactical bivouac in vicinity of Fels, Luxembourg and the remainder in billets in and around Heisdorf, Luxembourg. (See overlay #1)

By 101110 Dec 44 the Battalion completed relieving the 2nd Bn, 109 Infantry Regiment, in a sector of the line assigned to 9th AD. From 10-15 Dec 44 this Battalion occupied and defended the assigned sector. We patrolled actively along our front but nothing took place to change this sectors reputation of being exceptionally quiet. Dispositions and enemy units in contact (see overlay #2). Enemy activity for the above mentioned period was confined to very light artillery fire covering the Battalion sector and limited night patrolling.

At 160630 Dec 44 the Germans attacked our sector following a 1000 rd artillery preparation consisting chiefly of nebelwerfer and medium caliber artillery.

The attacking force was estimated at two Infantry Regiments, one to attack the Battalion and the other to move through and attack positions to our rear. The enemy used infiltration tactics successfully supported by many automatic weapons. The two main routes of infiltration were through the draws at Dilligen and Grundhof. The success of the infiltration tactics was aided by the heavily wooded terrain of our front line and our thinly held position. Vehicular bridges were established across the Our River at Dilligen, Wallendorf and Grundhof. From the moment the Germans were seen construct-

ing the above mentioned bridges they were heavily engaged with artillery fire by the 3rd FA Bn and mortar fire.

The situation became increasingly critical due to our over extended front and by noon the reserve company (Co B) minus its A/T platoon was committed between Cos A and C with mission of driving through and clearing the enemy from the near bank of the Our River. After meeting heavy opposition, Co B finally succeeded in occupying a position abreast of Cos A and C.

During the afternoon of the 16 Dec 44 the enemy infiltration tactics continued with success and the last of the Battalion reserve, the A/T platoon of Co B, employed as riflemen, were dispatched to reinforce the center of our weakened line.

After continued request for reinforcements, the morning of 17 Dec 44, CCA, 9th AD, having taken command of this sector 171100 Dec 44, attached to this Battalion, Troop A, 89th Rcn Squadron and the 3rd FA Bn assigned 3 medium tanks. This force was placed in reserve with exception of detachments of the Rcn troop which outposted Beaufort and patrolled our right flank. Also during the morning of the 17 Dec 44 two Rcn platoons were given the mission of clearing the enemy between Beaufort and our front lines and establishing contact with each front line element. Consequently, even though the heavy woods were not cleared, contact was gained with each front line unit.

By late afternoon the situation again became more critical and by darkness snipers had worked into Beaufort. All contact was lost with the front line companies and could not be restored. The 81mm mortar platoon was ambushed attempting to move into position and all company CP's in Beaufort were attacked and forced to withdraw with all Company Commanders cut off from their companies.

With the enemy in control of Beaufort and enemy patrols attempting to cut the only withdrawal route, the Beaufort-Haller road, at 171700 Dec 44 the Hq & Hq Co (minus) withdrew to Bn Motor Park, vicinity of Saverborn. (See overlay #3)

During the night 17-18 Dec 44 plans were drafted at CCA, 9th AD to attack at 180000 Dec 44 to relieve pressure on our surrounded rifle companies and to permit them to withdraw. The plan was to attack with two task forces consisting of one medium tank company, one light tank company, one company of Engineers employed as Infantrymen and two assault gun platoons along route (see overlay #3) toward Beaufort.

The attack proceeded as planned but encountered heavy enemy opposition at the L.D. in the form of Infantrymen with automatic weapons, anti-tank grenades and bazookas. At 181600 Dec 44 after an advance of 1500 yds the task forces were withdrawn. An enemy force of approximately 70 men engaged the CP in a fire fight from 180730 Dec 44 to 181400 Dec 44 from a distance of 200 yds. Battalion CP personnel, drivers and small administrative groups from Co CP's threw back all attempts to take the CP and at 1400 hours 50 prisoners of the aforementioned group surrendered. Throughout the day 250 enemy prisoners were taken and 100 were killed.

During 18 Dec 44 approximately 100 rds of 88 and 105 mm artillery fell in the vicinity of Bn CP. During the evening of 18 Dec 44 CO's of Cos B and C were sent to lead their companies to the rear. During the night of 18 Dec 44 the remnants of Co A and the M/G platoon successfully withdrew from their Beaufort position and were placed in the defensive line.

On 19 Dec 44 the defensive line Waldbillig-Ernsdorf was strengthened, the sector assigned to the 60th Armd Inf Bn remained principally the same with Co B, 19th Tank Bn attached to strengthen our de

fense. Enemy activity was confined to limited patrolling. The Bn CP was moved to 9136. During the night of 19 Dec 44 the remnants of Cos B and C arrived in an area near Fels, Luxembourg. This withdrawal was executed just prior to an enemy attack by troops estimated the size of a Battalion preceded by an artillery preparation to wipe out the surrounded companies.

From 20-23 Dec 44 our line was strengthened and Co C was moved up to occupy the right portion of the line. On the 21 Dec 44 an attack by 60 enemy Infantrymen on Co C's right flank was quickly repulsed. On the 23 Dec 44 an enemy counter-attack was launched by two Infantry Companies and two S/P 75 mm guns on the right of the sector at Savelborn. The entire attack was repulsed with heavy losses.

On 24 Dec 44 Co B was attached to 19th Tank Bn. From 23-26 Dec 44 the activity on both sides was limited to a heavy exchange of artillery fire and probing patrols.

At 261600 Dec 44 this Battalion was relieved in the Savelborn sector and as part of CCA, 9th AD, moved immediately to Longlier, Belgium. Arriving at 262345 Dec 44 CCA, 9th AD, was attached to the 4th AD and orders were issued for an attack at 270000 Dec 44, along the Neufchateau-Bastogne road to seize the high ground SW of Bastogne and make contact with friendly units in Bastogne. This unit and attachments were organized as TF Collins and consisted of the following: 60th Armd Inf Bn (less Co B attached to 19th Tank Bn) Co C, 19th Tank Bn; 3/A; 9th Armd Engrs; 1/C 811 TD; and 2/D 482 AAA.

The first resistance encountered was in vicinity of Sibret (see overlay #4). 40 PW's being taken. A PW stated they were left behind to cover the withdrawal of the main body to St Hubert, Belgium. Light resistance was also encountered in capturing the towns of Jodenville and Flohamont. 60 PW's were taken in these two towns along with quantities of arms and equipment. At darkness road blocks were established surrounding Sibret. Co C patrolled the town throughout the night and Co A occupied the high ground N of Sibret. Upon taking Sibret our direction of advance was changed to attack to attack to the North and secure the high ground N of Sibret which was accomplished by night fall 27 Dec 44.

On 28 Dec 44 Co A, with Co C, 19th Tank Bn attached, attacked the woods to North of the former position but were driven back by heavy enemy fire.


Throughout the remainder of the 28 Dec 44 and 29 Dec 44 vigorous patrolling was carried out. Enemy activity was relatively inactive.

On 30 Dec 44 TF Collins attacked and took Chenogne. Co C lead in the attack and after stiff fighting cleared all enemy resistance from high ground S of Chenogne and heavy woods to the right. Co A supported by Co C, 19th Tank Bn then passed through and cleared the town of Chenogne. At darkness our troops pulled back and occupied the high ground S of the town and an attached Rcn platoon of Troop B, 89th Rcn Squadron outposted the town.

At 2000 hrs the enemy attacked with an unknown number of tanks and Infantry and drove our outpost from Chenogne to our position S of the town.

At 2400 hrs the enemy probed our lines with two tanks and a platoon of infantry along the Sibret-Chenogne road but were repulsed.

On 31 Dec 44 at 0530 hrs the enemy launched a strong attack south from Chenogne apparently with the aim of cutting the Neufchateau-Bastogne road. This attack was launched by an enemy force estimated



the size of a brigade. Of this, an estimated battalion of infantry and a company of tanks attacked our position both frontally and from the flanks.

Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn with Co C, 19th Tank Bn was forced from the high ground S of Chenogne and they were ordered to fall back to their left. Just prior to the attack Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn was ordered to occupy the reserve position just north of Sibret. Remnants of the attached Tank Company and TD platoon fell back to the reserve position to support Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn.

The force of the attack struck the reserve position and was repulsed with very heavy losses. Simultaneously with the enemy counter-attack a Combat Command from the 11th AD was launching an attack NE through Jodenville and this threat to his flank apparently caused the enemy to withdraw his forces to the high ground S of Chenogne. By noon our troops had been reorganized and the line firmly established. Continued attacks by the 11th AD further relieved the pressure on our sector.

At the start of the action, enemy troops were decidedly aggressive and morale was high and troops appeared well fed, equipped, very young, but with little training. All troops were German.

This high spirit gradually subsided until the 30th, enemy troops were still well equipped, but poor fed and with low morale willing to surrender at the first opportunity. Troops were still entirely German. Many times the enemy surrendered when he still had A/T weapons, MG's & grenades that could have been used had they desired to make a stand.

Enemy artillery fire in vicinity of Sibret was notable because of its absence.

The weather from the 16th to 23rd Dec 44 was predominately cold and foggy enabling the enemy to move without fear of observation but from the 23rd to 31st Dec the weather was excellent and greatly curtailed the enemies daylight movements.

The terrain in vicinity of Beaufort greatly favored enemy movement by utilizing the deep wooded draws and countless trail and roads thereabouts. Heavy vehicles could move unobserved but the terrain did canalize most all traffic and prevent the mass use of tanks. The entire area was about 50% wooded but entirely cleared of underbrush.

The terrain in vicinity of Bastogne was predominately open rolling ground with the high ground affording excellent observation. The ground was frozen 10 inches deep, allowing heavy vehicle and tank traffic to proceed across country with very little obstruction. The creeks and streams were narrow and easily forded.

During the month the following damages and casualties were inflicted on the enemy: (See attached sheet)

Section IV - No comment.

Section V- See Attached overlays.

December Dates	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Killed	50	80	100	100	7	25	0	0	6	0
Prisoners	5	8	12	250	6	1	0	0	0	0
Wounded	50	72	?	50	40	75	0	0	12	0
Tanks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Artillery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AT Guns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3-88	0	0
Vehicles	4	0	0	0	1-T	0	0	0	0	0
Mortars	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MG's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Dates	26	27	28	29	30	31	Total
Killed	0	45	10	25	100	30	578
Prisoners	0	29	90	42	15	62	518
Wounded	0	2	4	15	5	2	327
Tanks	0	0	1-M4	2-M3 2-M4 2-M5	2-M4	4-M3 2-M4 2-M6	5-M3 7-M4 2-M5 2-M5
Artillery	0	0	0	0	3-105	1-75	4
A/T Guns	0	0	1-88	3	6	0	10
Vehicles	0	0	1-1/4	0	2-1/4	0	8
Mortars	0	0	0	4-81	1	0	5
MG's	0	0	0	3	6	20	29

K. W. Collins
 K.W. COLLINS,
 Lt Col., Infantry,
 Commanding.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

From: 010001 January 1945
To : 312400 January 1945

60th Armd Inf Bn.,
6 February 1945.
France.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.
2. Map References - Bastogne NE, Sheet 121 NE, 1/25,000
Bastogne, Sheet 121, 1/50,000
Carte-Michelin, Sheet 4, 1/200,000
Carte-Michelin, Paris-Reims, sheet 50, 1/200,000
Carte-Michelin, Verdun-Issanchouart, Sheet 57, 1/200,000
Neunkirchen, U1, 1/100,000
Saarbrücken, V1, 1/100,000
Lückange, Sheet 34/12, 1/50,000
3. Higher units and commanders of all subordinate troops -
 - a. Operations under following higher units:
 - (1) CCA, 9th Armored Division, - Colonel THOMAS L. HAROLD, Comdg
 - b. Commanders of all subordinate units:
 - (1) Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1st Lt LEO J. GRANN, Comdg
 - (2) Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. SCHLESSES, Comdg
 - (3) Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt FLOYD D. HERRER, Comdg
 - (4) Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1st Lt CLIFF ED. BIRDALL, Comdg
 - (5) Serv Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt LOUIS GALLING, Comdg
 - (6) Med Det, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt STEPHEN E. GAMES, Comdg

Section II - Statistical Data -

1. Personnel losses:

	<u>1-3 Jan</u>		<u>4-31 Jan</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	0	EM	0	EM	0	EM
a. Killed	0	7	0	0	0	7
b. Died of wounds	0	0	0	0	0	12
c. Wounded or injured	2	14	0	0	2	14

	<u>1-3 Jan</u>		<u>4-31 Jan</u>		<u>Total</u>	
		EM		EM		EM
d. Missing	0	6	0	0	0	6
e. Captured	0	0	0	0	0	0
f. Sick or other non-battle injuries	0	9	2	57	2	66

2. Personnel Replacements:

	<u>0</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Reinforcements (New Replacements)	9	570	579
b. Casuals (Personnel RTD)	0	26	26

3. Prisoners of War Taken: - 68

(1 January 1945 -	62
(2 " " -	6
(3 " " -	0
(4-31 " " -	0
	<u>68</u>

4. Vehicular losses -

1 ea 2½ ton truck, 6x6
 1 ea half-track M3
 1 ea half-track M3A1

5. Vehicular replacements -

12 ea half-tracks M2A1
 2 ea half-tracks M3A1
 2 ea 2 ton trucks, 4x4
 3 ea 2½ ton trucks, 6x6
 6 ea trailers, 1 ton cargo

6. Ammunition expenditure:

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. Rds Combat</u>	<u>No. Rds Tng</u>	<u>Total</u>
Grenades, rifle AT	60	540	600
Grenades, rifle WP	0	1440	1440
Grenades, Md., freg	435	0	435
Carbine, cal. .30	3750	3880	7630
Rifle, cal. .30 M1 w/c	7656	18604	26260
Cal. .45 M1911	2200	1290	3490
Machine gun, cal. .30	24000	5500	29500
Machine gun, cal. .50	6000	0	6000
60 mm HE	107	450	557
60 mm Illuminating	0	150	150
81 mm HE lt	274	160	434

Type	No. Rds Combat	No. Rds Tng	Total
81 mm HE hvy	0	20	20
81 mm Smoke	22	20	42
75 mm How, M48 M48	76	140	216
75 mm How, M48 M54	23	20	43
75 mm HE AT	12	20	32
75 mm Smoke	0	20	20
57 mm AT	0	225	225
Rocket, M9	185	0	185

Section III - Narrative.

From midnight to early morning, 1 January 1945 TF COLLINS, as part of CCA, 9th Armored Division, held the high ground immediately north of SIBRET, BELGIUM, from which position enemy counter-attacks had been repulsed the day before. During this period orders were received by TF COLLINS to attack that morning with the mission of clearing the heavy woods to the front and right front, and seize and occupy the high ground south of the RR between CHEMOGNE and SEMONCHAMPS (see overlay No. 1). Plans were formulated, subordinate commanders assembled, and orders issued promptly in preparation for the attack which was set for 1100 hours.

Following the counter-attacks by the enemy during the previous day, his operations in the sector to our front were strictly defensive in character.

The necessarily hasty reconnaissance made prior to our attack failed to locate the exact enemy positions in our zone of advance. After a 30 minute prearranged artillery barrage fired by the 3rd Armd FA Battalion, followed by a 15 minute period of fire by heavy direct fire supporting weapons, the attack jumped off with Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn and MG platoon attached leading. TF COLLINS consisting of the 60th Armd Inf Bn, less Company B, had attached Co C, 19th Tank Bn, 1st platoon, Co C, 811th TD Bn, 2nd platoon, Co D, 482d AAA Bn, and 3rd platoon, Co A, 9th Armd Engr Bn. With exception of 3rd platoon, Co A, 9th Armd Engr Bn, the attached units closely followed the leading elements in the attack and provided valuable supporting fires. The TF reserve was composed of Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn and 3rd platoon, Co A, 9th Armd Engr Bn.

It must be remembered at this point that at the time of this attack all combat companies of the 60th Armd Inf Bn and Co C, 19th Tank Bn were far below their T/O strengths.

Because of the vastness of the woods, it was decided early in the attack to attach a platoon of Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn to Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn in order to widen the attacking force's front. Within some five or six hours after the attack began, the woods had been flushed, and TF COLLINS was digging in on its objective. The woods were found to be relatively lightly defended by small groups of well dug in enemy without much artillery support. The enemy used mortars to cover approach trails with unobserved fire and machine guns, with apparently no plan of fire, firing direct fire only on sight. The enemy force in this woods was estimated to be 150 - 200. Two abandoned 88 mm

guns and five other abandoned AT positions were located in the woods. Fresh tank trails found indicated a withdrawal from this sector. In these woods we captured our first prisoners other than German (i.e. Polish, Czech, etc.). All prisoners had very low morale. Their equipment was plentiful, but consisted only of that which could be hand carried. Their supply transportation had broken down. Prisoners stated that they had been living off the country for the past five days.

During the day elements of the 11th Armored Division, attacking on our left, failed to advance according to plan, and TF KARSTETTER, attacking on our right, was driven back to its LD. This left TF COLLINS well forward with its flanks exposed.

To protect our exposed flanks and maintain contact with flanking units, B and C Troops, 89th Cav Rcn Sqd (Mech) were attached to the Task Force by CCA, 9th Armored Division.

On the morning of 2d January these two troops attacked and cleared a small woods just north of the RR finding therein only a few enemy stragglers (see overlay No. 1). After clearing the woods, these two Rcn Troops occupied positions along the northern edge of the woods. That afternoon, C Troop, 89th Cav Rcn Sqd (Mech) was pulled back from its position and reverted to the control of CCA, 9th Armored Division.

During the day, 2d January, TF KARSTETTER took the town of SENONCHAMPS and the 11th Armored Division made contact with elements of the 101st Airborne Division north and east of SENONCHAMPS. The move of the 11th Armored Division established a front line forward of the line held by TF COLLINS and TF KARSTETTER of CCA, 9th Armored Division.

TF COLLINS remained in position until units of CCA were relieved the following afternoon, 3d January, by elements of the 17th Airborne Division. Upon relief of CCA, Task Forces were disbanded and all attached elements reverted to their parent units. Immediately the 60th Armd Inf Bn, as part of CCA, began its march to the rear, spending the night, 4th January, in the vicinity of VOLAIVILLE, BELGIUM.

Enemy casualties during the three day period were 30 killed and 68 prisoners captured, plus 20 from our sector who surrendered to a unit on our left.

The weather for this period was crisp and clear with our air correspondingly hampering all enemy daylight activity. The ground was frozen ten inches deep, but as has been indicated, the terrain was thickly wooded, almost entirely limiting the operations to infantry. The terrain under enemy control was thickly wooded in spots, but was generally open rolling ground with high points affording excellent observation.

Period 4-10 January 1945: The march toward the rear was resumed on the morning of 4th January 1945 from the vicinity of VOLAIVILLE, BELGIUM, and that night the 60th Armd Inf Bn closed into bivouac in and around the town of VEIL

ST REMY, FRANCE (see overlay No. 2). The remainder of this period was utilized for reorganization of the battalion, reception and processing of reinforcements, reconditioning of old and receipt of new equipment, and plans for training new reinforcements.

Period 11-31 January 1945: On 11 January 1945 as part of CGA, we again moved, spending our first night in the vicinity of L'EDRUIL, FRANCE. The next day the march was resumed with the 60th Armd Inf'n closing into a bridgehead area in and near BENTZELSCHE, FRANCE, 12 January 1945 (see overlay No. 3). We occupied this area during the remainder of January.

This period was utilized in reconstituting basic loads of supplies, reconditioning of old and receipt of new equipment, and in intensive training in preparation for our return to battle.

Section IV - No comment.

Section V - Overlays.

K. W. Collins
K.W. COLLINS,
Lt Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

From: 010001 February 1945
To : 282400 February 1945

60th Armd Inf Bn.,
10 March 1945,
Germany.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.
2. Map References - Uckange, Sheet XXXIV-12: 1/25,000
Thionville, Sheet XXXIV-11: 1/25,000
Carte Michelin, Sheet 57, Verdun-Wissembourg: 1/200,000
Carte Michelin, Sheet 4, Mons-Luxembourg: 1/200,000
Carte Michelin, Sheet 3, Bruxelles-Liege: 1/200,000
Liege, Sheet 69: 1/50,000
Schleiden, Sheet 20: 1/50,000
3. Higher units and commanders of all subordinate troops -
 - a. Operations under following higher units:
 - (1) CCA, 9th Armored Division - Colonel THOMAS L. HARROLD, Comdg
 - b. Commanders of all subordinate units:
 - (1) Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1st Lt LEO J. GRAHAM, Comdg
 - (2) Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt JOHN W. SCHALLES, Comdg
 - (3) Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt FLOYD D. HARDER, Comdg
 - (4) Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt CLIFFORD E. PENROSE, Comdg
 - (5) Serv Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt LOUIS GELLING, Comdg
 - (6) Med Det, 60th Armd Inf Bn - Capt STEPHEN E. GATES, Comdg

609-7012

Section II - Statistical Data -

1. Personnel losses:

	O	EM	Total
a. Killed	0	1 (Accident)	1
b. Died of wounds	0	0	0
c. Wounded or injured	0	0	0
d. Missing	0	0	0
e. Captured	0	0	0

f. Sick or other non-battle injuries	<u>0</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
	1	38	39
2. Personnel Replacements -			
a. Reinforcements (new Repls)	<u>0</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
	0	7	7
b. Casuals (Personnel RTD)	3	45	48
3. Prisoners of war taken - None			
4. Vehicular losses - None			
5. Vehicular replacements -			
3 ea Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 4x4			
7 ea Carriers, Personnel M3A1			
2 ea Car, Halftrack, M2A1			
1 ea Truck, Weapons Carrier 4x4			
2 ea Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6x6			
6. Ammunition expenditure -			
	<u>Type</u>	<u>No. Rounds</u>	
Rifle, cal. .30, BAR		13,530	
Machine Gun, cal. .30		2,250	
Machine Gun, cal. .50		750	
60 mm HE		180	
81 mm HE		75	

Section III - Narrative

Period 1-22 February: At the beginning of February the companies of the 60th Armd Inf Bn were in billets in and near METZERESCHE, FRANCE, (see overlay No. 1) continuing their mission of reconstituting basic loads of supplies, reconditioning old and receiving new equipment, and intensive training in preparation for their return to battle.

On 9 Feb 45, Co A moved from NANCY, FRANCE, to better billets in DISTROFF, FRANCE, (see overlay No. 1) and there continued its mission as outlined in par. 1.

Period 23-27 February: Early on the morning of 21 February, an officer from this battalion was ordered to Division Headquarters to act as billeting officer for the battalion in its move to BELGIUM on 23 February. At 0700 on 23 Feb 45, the 60th Armd Inf Bn, as part of CCA, 9th Armored Division began marching from its billet areas in the vicinity of METZERESCHE, FRANCE, to new billet areas near TROUZ, BELGIUM, (see overlay No. 2), closing in the new areas at 2315 after a march of 186 miles. During the remaining days of the period, the battalion made preparations for its movement into GERMANY.

The Co Comdrs and staff of the 60th Armd Inf Bn assembled at the Bn CP in TROUZ, BELGIUM, at 0800, 28 Feb 45 to receive orders from the Bn Comdr for march-

ing into GERMANY. The march began at 1215, with the battalion marching as part of CCA, 9th Armored Division, and at 2130 the battalion closed into its assembly area at DROVE, GERMANY, (see overlay No. 3).

At a unit commanders meeting held at, Headquarters CCA at 2200, the CO, 60th Armd Inf Bn was placed in command of TASK FORCE COLLINS, consisting of 60th Armd Inf Bn (less Co C); Co C, 19th Tk Bn; 3d Plat, Co A, 9th Armd Engr Bn, and 1st Plat, Co A, 656 TD Bn. The commanders of these units met the TF commander at the Bn CP at 2345 and began receiving the plans and orders for the attack the next day.

Section IV - No comment.

Section V - Overlays.



K. W. COLLINS,
Lt Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

~~SECRET~~

AFTER ACTION REPORT

From: O10001 March 1945
To : 312400 March 1945

60th Armd Inf Bn.,
10 April 1945,
Germany.

PART I

Section I - Introduction.

1. Campaign - Western Europe.

2. Map References -

- a. MAP OF GERMANY, SCALE 1/25,000, Geographical Section, General Staff, #4414, Sheets: 5205, 5206, 5305, 5306, 5307, 5309, 5407, 5408, 5409, 5410, 5509, 5510, 5511, 5611.
- b. MAP OF GERMANY, SCALE 1/50,000, Geographical Section, General Staff, #4507, Sheets: 81, 101, 131.
- c. MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE, SCALE 1/100,000, Geographical Section, General Staff, #4416, Sheets: 82, 83, 83.

3. Higher Units and Commanders of all Subordinate Troops:

a. Operations under following higher units:

- (1) O10001 Mar 45, CGA, 9th Armd Div - Colonel THOMAS L. HARROLD, Comdg
- (2) 121800 Mar 45, CCB, 9th Armd Div - Brig Gen WILLIAM M. HOGE, Comdg
- (3) 122300 Mar 45, 311 Inf, 78th Div - Colonel C. M. WILLINGHAM, Comdg
- (4) 172100 Mar 45, CCB, 9th Armd Div - Brig Gen WILLIAM M. HOGE, Comdg
- (5) 192400 Mar 45, CGA, 9th Armd Div - Colonel THOMAS L. HARROLD, Comdg
- (6) 211200 Mar 45, CCB, 9th Armd Div - Brig Gen WILLIAM M. HOGE, Comdg
- (7) 231000 Mar 45, CGA, 9th Armd Div - Colonel THOMAS L. HARROLD, Comdg

b. Commanders of all subordinate units:

- (1) Hq Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1-11 Mar, 1st Lt LEO J. GRAHAM, Comdg
12-31 Mar, Capt JOHN W. HALL, Comdg
- (2) Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1-31 Mar, Capt JOHN W. SCHALLER, Comdg
- (3) Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1-31 Mar, Capt FLOYD D. HANSEN, Comdg
- (4) Co C, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1-15 Mar, Capt CLIFFORD E. PENROSE, Comdg
16-31 Mar, 1st Lt VINCENT P. MCCARTHY, Comdg
- (5) Stry Co, 60th Armd Inf Bn - 1-31 Mar, Capt LOUIS GELLING, Comdg
- (6) COMMUNICATION Armd Inf Bn - 1-15 Mar, Capt STEPHEN E. GATES, Comdg
16-19 Mar, 1st Lt JOHN R. POTTER, Comdg
20-31 Mar, Capt FRANK A. GELLAR, Jr, Comdg

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Section II - Statistical Data -

1. Personnel Losses:	<u>0</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Killed	6	110	116
b. Died of wounds	0	14	14
c. Wounded or injured	10	445	455
d. Missing	0	5	5
e. Captured	0	0	0
f. Sick or other non-battle injuries	1	103	104
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>677</u>	<u>694</u>

2. Personnel replacements:	<u>0</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Reinforcements (new replacement)	9	502	511
b. Casuals (Personnel RTD)	1	115	116
Total	<u>10</u>	<u>617</u>	<u>627</u>

3. Prisoners of war taken - 2580 (See attached chart Section III)

4. Vehicular losses -

4 ea Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4
 1 ea Carrier, personnel, M3A1, H/T
 1 ea Carrier, personnel, M3, H/T
 1 ea Half Track, M2

5. Vehicular Replacements -

2 ea Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton 4x4
 3 ea Carrier, Personnel, M3, H/T
 2 ea Carrier, Cargo, M-29

6. Ammunition Expenditures -

	<u>No. of Rounds</u>
Carbine, cal. .30	36,000
Caliber .45, ball	12,000
Rifle, cal. .30, 8/rd clip	124,400
Rifle, cal. .30, 5/rd clip (Bar)	12,800
Machine Gun, cal. .30	230,200
Machine Gun, cal. .50	14,620
Grenades, Hand, Frag.	2,100
Grenades, Hand, W.P.	986
60 mm Mortar, H.E.	390
81 mm Mortar, H.E. and Smoke	648
105 mm How, Smoke	142
105 mm How, H.E., Hvy	380
105 mm How, H.E., Lt	732
Rockets, A.T.	400
Mines, A.T.	50

Section III - Narrative

On 28 Feb 45, as part of CGA, 9th Armd Div, the 60th Armd Inf Bn marched from BELGIUM to an assembly area in the village of DROVE (F136377), GERMANY, closing shortly before midnight, prepared to enter its first combat since the "Battle of the Bulge". By 010030 Mar 45, the CO, 60th Armd Inf Bn commanding TF COLLINS, composed of 60th Armd Inf Bn (less Co C); Co C 19th Tk Bn; 3d Plat Co A 9th Armd Engr Bn; & 1 Plat Co A 656 TD Bn, completed issuing his order for an attack that morning. Early morning 1 Mar TF COLLINS began marching in vehicles toward its objective, WOLLERSHEIM (F173310), with the advance guard, B/60th w/1 Plat C/19th Tk Bn attached, crossing the line of departure, BERS (F1A1320), GERMANY at 0700 (see overlay No. 1). As the advance guard passed through BERS, the enemy fired approximately 50 rds of 105 mm arty into the town causing a short delay in the advance. Upon clearing the town, the TF met a stubborn enemy force estimated at a rifle company supported by several MG & A/T weapons firing from prepared positions S & E of the town. Because of this resistance Co B, 60th Armd Inf Bn was forced to dismount and continue the attack on foot. The terrain in this sector was rolling and fairly open, affording excellent defensive positions. Utilizing an extensive network of trenches for movement, the enemy gradually withdrew to high ground one & one-half (1½) mi SE of BERS to more prepared positions, while its arty kept up a general harassing fire over our entire route of advance. The first PWs captured that morning were identified as being from the 3d Paratroop Division. The weather during the morning was cloudy and a light rain fell during the afternoon.

Due to determined enemy resistance against Co B, Co A, 60th Armd Inf Bn was committed at 1400 in a flanking attack toward what was believed to be the enemy's right flank. Utilizing a draw which led almost to the edge of the TF objective, Co A advanced to the NW edge of WOLLERSHEIM where it was immediately pinned down by heavy arty, MG & A/T fire, forcing it to take cover in narrow enemy trenches in that section. This flanking attack, however, caused the enemy to withdraw from the high ground in front of Co B to prepared positions along the edge of town. Immediately after Co B occupied the high ground 1000 yds W of WOLLERSHEIM abandoned by the enemy, it successfully defended the hill against a counterattack by three enemy tanks and approximately 100 infantrymen.

Having exact locations of Cos A & B positions, the enemy continued heavy arty & MG fire against those positions, making it impossible for either company to advance during the night. Throughout the night, the enemy used white phosphorous and amber flares extensively, which aided them in pinning down patrols sent out by Co A in an effort to locate well camouflaged automatic and direct fire weapons.

Early morning 2 Mar, Co C 60th Armd Inf Bn was attached to TF COLLINS. At 0700 that morning Cos A & B launched another attack for WOLLERSHEIM which proved unsuccessful. Co A could not advance because of observed arty & automatic weapons fire hitting from the front and flanks. Co B advanced approximately 300 yds before being forced back to its original position by intensive fire from direct fire weapons in town and from automatic weapons and sniper fire from the high ground S of the town.

At 1020 Co C was committed in a wide dismounted flanking attack through a draw to the NW of town as Co B in position reverted to Bn reserve (see overlay

No. 1). Although the attack by Cos A & C was slowed down at times by intense fire from the enemy, Co A entered the town and began clearing it. Shortly after noon the enemy began surrendering, and at 1715 the town was officially cleared. The 195 prisoners taken during the day definitely identified the enemy as one Bn of the 3d Paratroop Division. After being cleared, the town was occupied for the night by Co A and outposted on the high ground to the E by Co C, while the remainder of TF COLLINS remained in position W of town. During the night Co C 19th Tk Bn was relieved from attachment to TF COLLINS and Co A of the same Bn was attached.

Early 3 Mar Co C 60th Armd Inf Bn with 1 Plat Co A 19th Tk Bn and 1 Plat Co A 9th Armd Hqr Bn attached, moved eastward from positions E of WOLLERSHEIM and at 0645 occupied LANGENDORF (F 20931A), encountering only light enemy sniper fire in the town. When Co C (+) began its move, the remainder of TF COLLINS occupied WOLLERSHEIM (see overlay No. 2).

At noon 4 Mar TF COLLINS in column began its move toward a LD, OBBERLWENICH (F277341) to NIBBENICH (F258328), with the mission of clearing the N edge of HUSKIRCHEN (F390295) and seizing a crossing on the ERFT RIVER in its zone of action. At the LD the attack was launched with Cos A & C 60th Armd Inf Bn abreast. (See overlay No. 2). The first enemy resistance, although light, was encountered soon after the leading elements cleared FRAUENBERG (F296323). However, occasional fire from enemy automatic and direct fire weapons often pinned down our riflemen. The enemy withdrew through HUSKIRCHEN leaving emplaced 88 mm guns unmanned and stocked with ammunition. Enemy arty was noticeably absent. In HUSKIRCHEN some sniper fire was received, and the streets were blocked by bomb craters and rubble from fallen buildings, making it impossible for vehicles larger than $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks to move through the town until early the next morning. The bridge over the ERFT RIVER had been blown when troops of TF COLLINS arrived. However, combat troops were able to cross, and a bridgehead was established by Cos A & C at 050500 Mar. (See overlay No. 3). Throughout the day and night of 4 Mar the weather was dull and rainy, and the terrain from the LD to the objective was flat and open.

During the day 5 Mar, TF COLLINS finished and occupied its portion of HUSKIRCHEN and maintained the bridgehead while engineers constructed a crossing over the ERFT RIVER. At 2145 Co C 60th Armd Inf Bn, with 1 Plat Co A 19th Tk Bn attached, attacked across the ERFT RIVER with the objective of taking PALMERSHEIM (F360267). Light resistance was encountered enroute and in the town, but by 0615 the next morning the objective was cleared of the enemy. The 200 estimated enemy troops observed withdrawing from PALMERSHEIM shortly after daylight were brought under effective arty fire.

On the morning 6 Mar, TF COLLINS (less Co C/60th & 1st Plat A/19) moved from HUSKIRCHEN to ODENDORF (F398280) closing at 0755 where it received orders to continue the attack of CCA, 9th Armd Div passing through friendly units at RHKINBACH (F445255) as soon as that town had been cleared. With A/60th & 1st Plat A/19th attached as advance guard, TF COLLINS moved from ODENDORF, crossing the LD RHKINBACH, 061300 Mar 45 with a series of towns to the SE as its objectives (See overlays 3a & 3b). At the first objective, WORMERSDORF (F474235) the advance guard met enemy resistance from SP A/T & AAA guns. Despite heavy fire directed at them, the enemy would not withdraw and held out until destroyed. At 2100 the first objective was cleared and occupied by the advance guard, while Co

C 60th Armd Inf Bn relieved 4th 1 Plat Co A 19th Tk Bn passed through and assumed advance guard positions to the next objective, ERSDOEF (F485220). When Co C/60 with its tanks occupied the 2d objective at 2220 without opposition, it became evident to Lt Col COLLINS, TF Comdr, that a breakthrough had been effected. Without hesitation and by aggressive and energetic planning, the TF Comdr exploited this success by pushing the attack until early the next morning when the TF halted for reorganization and consolidation of positions at LANTERSHOFEN (F555176).

Lt Col COLLINS organized, within his TF, three separate sub-task forces of one rifle company and one tank platoon each. After the second objective had been taken, the attack was principally a night march involving the tactics of one sub-task force attacking until ammunition was exhausted and another task force taking the lead without hesitation. Using these tactics Co C/60 w/tank Plat took ALTHEDORF (F489217) at 2255; GELSDORF (F507212) at 2350; VETTELHOVEN (F521194) at 0040; and BOLINGEN (F537188) at 0115. At this point Co B/60 w/tank Plat passed through Co C and took LANTERSHOFEN at 0205. Here TF COLLINS halted with Cos B & C occupying defensive positions on the high ground just E of town, and the balance of the TF closed into LANTERSHOFEN. (See overlay No. 3a). Weather during this operation was dull and rainy, and terrain went from flat and open to hilly as we approached the RHINE RIVER. During the attack enemy was taken completely by surprise and surrendered without opposition. Prisoners were carried on our vehicles to a PW coll pt established in LANTERSHOFEN. Several groups of much surprised German soldiers were bypassed during the night and later surrendered voluntarily to our service units. LANTERSHOFEN was lightly harassed by arty and A/T fire throughout the day 7 Mar 45, and enemy from the surrounding vicinity kept surrendering voluntarily all day.

Co A 60th Armd Inf Bn relieved Co C 60th Armd Inf Bn in its defensive sector at 071535 Mar 45, and that night all wires leading from the battalion CP were cut by some unknown person.

With plans laid and orders issued to continue our attack in a southeasterly direction toward the RHINE RIVER on the morning 8 Mar as part of OCA, TF COLLINS received last minute orders about midnight to cancel all prior plans and move to SINZIG (F658164) with the mission of protecting the REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD in a sector W of the RHINE RIVER. 080645 Mar 45, the TF moved into SINZIG and by noon of the same day Cos A & C occupied defensive positions on the high ground S of town. (See overlay No. 3b). Friendly patrols reconnoitering forward of our positions encountered dug in enemy infantry and road blocks at NIEDESECKELSIG (F690125) and at CR 500 yds SE of BEULERHOF (F635134). Since no ground attacks were made by the enemy against the bridge from the W bank of the RHINE, the situation remained unchanged until the afternoon of 9 Mar 45 when all attached units reverted to the control of their parent units, and the 60th Armd Inf Bn was relieved from defensive positions by elements of the 23d Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div.

A new defensive sector along the W bank of the RHINE was assigned to the 60th Armd Inf Bn on 10 Mar 45 and was occupied by Co A at 0400. (See overlay No. 4). The battalion was relieved from its defensive sector along the RHINE by elements of the 23d Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div on 11 Mar and placed on a one (1) hour alert. The next day the alert status was changed to two (2) hours. During the period 8-12 Mar, when Cos were not defending a sector in the vic of SINZIG, their time

was consumed in receiving, processing and training reinf, maint of vehicles, arms and equipment, and reconstituting basic loads. Enemy arty continually harassed the town of SINZIG and vic during this period, and enemy air was active, but neither bombed nor strafed the area.

Effective at 121800 Mar 45 the 60th Armd Inf Bn was attached to CCB, 9th Armd Div. Immediately orders were received to move the battalion to the vic of UNKEL (F638215), and at 2025 the battalion began marching from SINZIG closing in its new assembly area at 2315. During this march the battalion crossed the RHINE RIVER, using a pontoon bridge constructed by US Army Engrs in the vic of KRIPP (F670163), approximately 2000 yds S & E of the now famous ~~REHAGEN~~ BRIDGE.

Upon closing into its first assembly area E of the RHINE RIVER, the 60th Armd Inf Bn was attached to the 311th Inf Regt. Early the next morning 13 Mar the battalion was ordered to RHEINBREITBACH (F642245) for a short time and then to HONNEF (F641276) where it was assigned the mission of securing the town which had been taken by another unit that day. In addition to occupying a defensive sector near the NE edge of town, Co A was given the mission of clearing a small woods to the E. Our units encountered light small arms resistance and arty fire while moving through the SE section of town to their positions. At 1700 all Cos were ordered back into town and established a system of road blocks (see overlay No. 4).

As part of the 311th Inf Regt, the 60th Armd Inf Bn on 14 Mar was assigned the mission of taking a series of numbered objectives, high hills and towns in a sector N & E of HONNEF (see overlay No. 4). From an attack position E of HONNEF which had been moved into before daylight, Co B pushed off at 0700 in an attack of a high hill, objective No. 14. The hill, although steep, rocky and heavily wooded, was lightly defended by the enemy, and by 0830 Co B was on its objective. When Co B reached its objective, Co C was ordered to attack around the right flank of the position with the mission of seizing objective No. 15, the town of FERLENHARDT (F664307) and surrounding high ground. As Co C began its attack, the enemy threw a small counterattack against objective No. 14 which was repulsed.

At 0950 Co A was ordered to move around the left of objective No. 14 and attack another hill to the left front of Co B, objective No. 17. About noon the enemy increased its shelling of objective No. 14 with heavy concentrations of arty and followed with a second counterattack which was also repulsed. In spite of heavy small arms fire, Co A reached its objective at 1445 and began digging in for defense.

Following a terrific arty barrage, the enemy launched the third counter-attack against objective No. 14 at 1600 with over 150 men supported by direct fire weapons. The counterattack was successful in bending back the right flank of the position held by Co B and cutting the road between Cos A & B. After approximately two hours of heavy fighting, during which time many hard to hand battles took place, the enemy was driven back and the position held by Co B was restored. (See overlay No. 4). However, the enemy still controlled the road between objectives No. 14 & 17 and part of the area around objective No. 17, making physical contact between Co A and other units of the battalion impossible. Until the next morning, when a mtd msgr from Bn Hq reached Co A, the only means

of communication with the unit on objective No. 17 was by radio and that failed several hours at a time.

Initially Co C gained ground in its attack toward objective No. 15, but later ran into a stiff and determined enemy who had not yielded the objective by 1900 when orders were issued for Co C to hold up for the night in its location approximately 200 yds S of the objective. From PWs captured during the day the enemy was identified as a group of miscellaneous units organized under a unit of the 3d Paratroop Division.

The attack was resumed at 0630 15 Mar with Co B having the mission of taking two hills a few hundred yards in front of objective No. 14 (see overlay No. 4), and Co C the mission of continuing toward its objective. About 1030 a mtd msgr from battalion reached Co A with orders for that unit to attack at 1230 to seize and occupy objective No. 16, MARGARETHENHOF (F656310) and nearby villages (see overlay No. 4). Early afternoon Co B had secured its objective and by 1800 both Cos A & C were on their objectives preparing to hold up for the night. In all the attacks this day only scattered ground opposition was encountered by our troops. However, the enemy used its arty to fire intense and accurate barrages on all positions.

Because of the hilly terrain, the actions engaged in by our troops from the crossing of the RHINE RIVER to this point were all done without the use of vehicles or vehicular weapons. Since communications within an Armored Infantry Battalion are dependent upon vehicular participation in the fighting, communications during the done fighting engaged in by our troops over this hilly and rugged terrain would have proved a serious handicap had not SCR 300 radios been issued to us prior to the actions. Even though we could have used more, the six sets issued and distributed one each to the rifle companies, one to Bn Hq and two to the mortar platoon proved to be the answer to a difficult problem. In this type of action an Armored Infantry Battalion had to fight as regular foot infantry without the advantages of T/O communications personnel and equipment peculiar to the latter.

On 15 Mar a tank plat of Co C 774th Tk Bn and 1 Plat of TDs were attached to the 60th Armd Inf Bn. Late that night, orders were received from Regtl Hq changing the direction of attack for the battalion from N to NE and assigning objectives No. 34 & 35, the city of ITTENBACH (F669314), to be taken on Regtl Order the following morning.

At 160600 Mar Cos A & C complied with orders to move further into objective No. 16 to secure better positions from which to launch an attack against the city of ITTENBACH. Upon receipt of the Regtl Order to attack objectives No. 34 & 35, Cos A & C abreast jumped off at 0910 with a tank plat attached to Co C. Co B was then ordered to occupy objective No. 16 as battalion reserve. The enemy, registering a battalion of arty on both the city of ITTENBACH and objective No. 16, kept an intense concentration on our troops throughout the day. Co A, although faced with intense arty barrages and direct fire from large caliber A/T guns, during its advance, met only slight small arms resistance in its sector and by 1515 gained its objective, that portion of the city W of the creek. (See overlay No. 4). However, Co C in addition to receiving heavy arty poundings in its sector, met an enemy force of some 200 men supported by two Mark VI tanks.

With the help of prepared dug in positions and fortified houses, the enemy was successful in holding Co C, to which was also attached the TD plat, from clearing its objective that night. The next morning at 0930 a German Captain, representing the Commanding Officer of the unit defending the town, under the white flag of truce, contacted Lt McCarthy, CO Co C, in an effort to arrange a two hour armistice during which they could collect German dead and evacuate civilians from town. Without hesitation and with stern determination and force, Lt McCarthy answered the request by giving the Captain a warning that if the German Comdr did not surrender his position and all his officers and men as PWs within 20 minutes, he would call on all his arty and tanks to burn the town, and then would have his armor overrun the German strong points killing as many soldiers as possible. Failing to get better terms after a short discussion, the Captain took the message to his commander. At 1000 a full Colonel with his staff reported to the CP of Co C to accept terms of unconditional surrender. By noon the 14 officers and 175 men had been collected and surrendered by the staff, and Co C occupied and secured its objective. Upon interrogation it was found that the full Colonel had been the CO of an arty unit whose guns had been taken away and its men attached to the 3d Paratroop Division. However, at the time of his surrender, this officer was the senior left in the division, and his unit the largest. Their mission was to protect the AUTOBAN HIGHWAY in that sector.

That night when its positions were taken over at 1900 by the 2d Bn, 310th Inf Regt, the 60th Armd Inf Bn was relieved from attachment to the 311th Inf Regt and reverted to control of CCB, 9th Armd Div. Upon leaving ITTEBACH the battalion marched to HONNEF closing at 2330. There it received orders to move to the vic of LIEK (F678187) the next morning at 0700 over the same route used in its march to HONNEF (see overlay No. 4). This movement was completed at 1115 hours 18 Mar. At 192400 Mar the battalion in place was attached to CCA, 9th Armd Div, and at 211200 Mar reverted back to control of CCB. During the period 18-21 Mar the battalion was out of contact with the enemy and used the time for maintenance of vehicles and equipment, receipt and processing of reinforcement and sending a few officers and men to Paris on 3 day passes. Enemy activity for the period consisted of sporadic concentrations of long range arty fire and some air activity.

Receiving orders during the night of 21 Mar to move to an assembly area in the vic of HAMMERSTEIN (F727085) in preparation for an attack early the next morning, the battalion moved at 0230 closing into its assigned area at 0350. Without vehicles the three rifle companies in the order of A, C, B moved from their assembly area at 0600 and followed the 27th Armd Inf Bn across the LD where they turned left into a sector on the left flank and parallel to that of the 27th Armd Inf Bn. The battalion mission was to move eastward as quickly as possible, seize a crossing and establish a bridgehead over the WIED RIVER in its zone. With Cos A & C abreast and Co B in support, the battalion attacked on schedule. The extremely hilly terrain in the battalion sector coupled with a stubborn enemy supported by arty, mortars & numerous 20 mm AA guns made movement toward the objective slow. Toward nightfall both Cos A & C reached the river to find that all bridges had been blown. However, Co C was successful in locating a small foot bridge in its sector, and without hesitation pushed over the river at 1830 gaining and organizing the high ground on the E bank by 1930. As soon as Co C crossed, Cos A & B were ordered to cross at the same

point, and Co A was given the mission of occupying the high ground on the right flank of Co C. The mission of Co B remained unchanged. (See overlay No. 5).

Early on the morning 23 Mar Co B 14th Tk Bn, crossed the river over a blown but passable bridge a few hundred yards N of our battalion sector in the zone of the 2d Inf Div to help support the bridgehead established. At 1000 the battalion, plus other units attached to CCB, reverted to the control of CCA, and Cos A & C, 60th Armd Inf Bn moved forward approximately 800 yds to better defensive positions where they remained that day. (See overlay No. 5).

When patrols from Cos A & C reported no contact with the enemy at midnight in the sector for 1500 yds to our front, orders were issued to move forward some 2000 yds abreast of the unit on our right flank to straighten the Combat Command front line. With Cos A & B abreast, Co B on the right, and Co C following Co A in support, the battalion attacked at 0200 24 Mar meeting only light scattered resistance and consolidated its objective by 0600. (See overlay No. 6).

A fragmentary order received from CCA on the night of 24 Mar attached Co B 14th Tk Bn and one Platoon Co A 9th Armd Engr Bn, to the 60th Armd Inf Bn. The order assigned the TF the mission of crossing the SAYN RIVER in its zone of action and then moving S to take, in order, the town of BENDORF (F887027), the town of VALLENDAR (F916003), and the high ground in the vic of MALLENDAR (L917990).

It Col COLLENS, TF Comdr, issued the following plan and order: Co C would send a combat patrol across the river and into BENDORF to determine enemy strength and disposition and to report back by midnight. Based upon information brought back by the patrol, Co C would attack immediately in an effort to cross the SAYN RIVER, and if possible, take BENDORF. Whether this part of the plan was successful or not, Co B followed by Co A would cross the ID at 250500 Mar. If Co C was successful in its attack on BENDORF, Co B with Co B/14 attached would bypass the town and seize the next objective, VALLENDAR. When this was completed, Co A would bypass VALLENDAR and seize the final objective.

The patrol returned shortly after midnight with the report that an enemy force of some 200 men supported by automatic weapons and SP guns was defending the W bank of the river. At 250200 Mar Co C attacked and advanced steadily without difficulty until reaching the river, when slight confusion, due to darkness and enemy action, forced the company to withdraw to the W of BENDORF, thus preventing a crossing. The main body of the TF crossed the ID at 0500, and by 1110 Co B/60 followed by Co A/60 and supported by fire from Co B/14 succeeded in crossing the river over a small foot bridge and entered BENDORF. Approximately 150 PWs surrendered without much fighting. A/T mines hastily laid in the streets by the enemy were removed by civilians before our troops entered. The tanks and Co C were then ordered to cross the river over the main highway bridge between ENGERS and BENDORF which was captured intact by the 27th Armd Inf Bn.

As soon as the tanks & Co C entered BENDORF, they were ordered to move S on the main highway parallel to the RHINE RIVER, bypass WEITERSBURG (F903015), and attack VALLENDAR. Co A was ordered to follow the TF to a point in the vic of WEITERSBURG, send a platoon to occupy the town and await further orders. The platoon gained its objective taking approximately 40 PWs. Co B was given the mission of clearing BENDORF and then relieving the platoon from Co A in WEITERSBURG where it would revert to battalion reserve. This was accomplished by 1400.

Against very light opposition, the sub-task force advanced to the outskirts of VALLENDAR by 1320 where its progress was slowed down and stopped on numerous occasions by terrific barrages from 20 mm and 40 mm AA guns on the high ground which was the Bn final objective. Because this force was making very slow progress, at 1710, Co A, was ordered to move around the left flank of Co C with the mission of neutralizing the AA guns firing on Co C and occupying the Bn final objective.

By 2000 the northern edge of VALLENDAR had been cleared, and Co B moved in. Co C continued its mission of clearing the town and completed it shortly before midnight. At 0400 Co A reported all AA guns destroyed and the Bn final objective occupied. (See overlay No. 6).

Shortly before midnight 25 Mar, word was received from CCA that we would be relieved in place sometime the following day by elements of CCR, after which time the battalion would be prepared to attack eastward. By noon 26 Mar, relief of our units by the 27th Armd Inf Bn was completed, and the battalion began readying itself for crossing the ID at 1500 in its new attack. With the mission of clearing the town of HILLSHEID (F973007) and then following the "Yellow" route to a point some 5000 yds, further E, the 60th Armd Inf Bn marched at the head of the main body of CCA's column in the order Co B with one plat of tanks and one plat of Engrs attached; Co A; Co B 14th Tk Bn (-); Bn Hq; Co C; Med Det; Hq Co. Serv Co reverted to control of CCA trains (see overlay No. 7).

HILLSHEID was passed through without opposition although Co B delayed its advance long enough to check the town thoroughly. As the column marched to its assigned objective, encountering no armed resistance and delayed only on three occasions by prepared road blocks or blown craters in the road, CCA ordered the 60th Armd Inf Bn to continue its advance on route "Yellow" to the LAHN RIVER at DIEZ (M195969). Reaching the W bank of the LAHN RIVER at 1950 without opposition, the 60th Armd Inf Bn there met its first resistance from a group of stubborn enemy dug in on the E bank. When a crossing was attempted by our troops, it was found that all bridges over the river in the sector had been blown. Lt Col COLLINS ordered the attached Engr plat to construct a foot bridge. However, because of the width, depth and swift current of the river, such a bridge could be constructed only at points well covered by observed enemy small arms fire with the result that the Engr mission could not be accomplished. Attempts to ford the river failed, and patrols were unable to find crossing sights on either flank of the CCA sector. The order was then given for the Tank Co to move into firing position on the W bank of the river and pulverize the buildings and possible enemy firing positions on the E bank. This mission was accomplished with excellent results.

The next morning at daylight Cos B & C were sent N to the vic of LIMBURG (M234986), where a crossing had been established by friendly units, with the mission of crossing the river and attacking DIEZ from the N and E. (See overlay No. 7). While this maneuver was in progress an engineer soldier swam to the E bank of the river at the S edge of DIEZ and untied a long barge anchored there. Since the barge was longer than the river was wide at that point, it was pulled diagonally across the river forming a foot bridge over which Co A was passed without hesitation.

For the first time the 60th Armd Inf Bn had available for its use a powerful

public address system which it set up on the W bank of LAHN RIVER. Warnings were broadcast to the civilians and soldiers on the other side while Co A cleared the city. Due to the effects of the tank firing during the night, the speedy crossing of Co A and the warnings broadcasted to the people and soldiers, the dug in enemy on the E bank of the LAHN RIVER and those in position in the town of DIEZ, numbering one Major, several officers and approximately 200 EM, surrendered without further resistance. Cos A, B, & C then took up defensive positions around the town. (See overlay No. 7).

After DIEZ had been cleared, Engrs of the 1st US Army & Co A 9th Armd Engr Bn began constructing a treadway bridge over the river. However, at mid-afternoon, orders were received to cease all bridging operations, and the 60th Armd Inf Bn was informed that all orders for movement were cancelled for 24 hrs.

The battalion remained in position until 1115, 28 Mar when it was relieved in place by the 2d Ranger Bn. Upon relief the battalion made plans to comply with an order to march NE, as part of CCA, to an assembly area in the vic of HOFEN (G301030). Co C/60 was attached to CCA and assigned a special mission of moving without delay to AUMENAU (G367007) and there relieve elements of CCB protecting a bridgehead over the LAHN RIVER. This change of direction was the beginning of the march of the 9th Armd Div to join forces with elements of the 9th US Army and seal off the RHUR POCKET.

CCA began moving in one column at 1400 to the new assembly area with the 60th Armd Inf Bn less Co C marching near the end of the column behind seven other units. This was a new experience for the 60th Armd Inf Bn since it usually led or followed the advance guard of any CCA column. At 2000 the battalion closed into HOFEN and immediately set up road blocks and a system of all-round security for the night. (See overlay No. 8).

That night, orders were received that CCA would continue the advance in one column at 0600 the next day to an assembly area in the vic of HAUSEN (G708169) and the 60th Armd Inf Bn would maintain its same place in column. Co C/60 would revert to battalion control when the battalion crossed the LAHN RIVER at AUMENAU.

By noon 29 Mar, the advance of CCA was making such progress that the column was ordered to continue to phase line DENVER (see overlay No. 9). The 60th Armd Inf Bn closed into billets at ERBENHAUSEN (G939407) at 1945 and set up security for the night awaiting orders for the next day.

The Letter of Instructions from CCA 29 Mar stated CCA would continue the attack in one column on the morning of 30 Mar with 60th Armd Inf Bn in the lead crossing the LD, KIRTORF (G965420), at 0600. The mission for the day was to seize a crossing over the EDER RIVER in the vic of FRITZLAR (H020580). The Bn order of march was Co A with one plat Co B 14th Tk Bn, and one plat of Engrs which were to be picked up at the LD attached; Co B 14th Tk Bn (-); Bn Hq; Co B; Co C; Hq Co; & Serv Co. The battalion also had attached a tank from the 738th Tk Bn with a public address system.

The attack moved to within three kilometers of its objective by 1330 with only one delay of an hour and a half at TREYSA (H020580) due to sniper fire. Three kilometers outside FRITZLAR the enemy had a 150 mm AT gun and a 20 mm AA gun serving as an outpost for an airfield just S of the EDER RIVER. After the

tanks at the head of the column fired a few rounds of HE in and near the positions, the enemy surrendered the two guns without firing a shot.

After the outpost was taken care of, Co A and attached tanks moved without delay to the left flank of the airfield catching most of the air corps personnel on or near the field completely by surprise causing great confusion within the enemy ranks. As one German plane tried to take off in the face of fire from our tanks, it was shot down when a tanker knocked off the tail with a rd from his big gun as the plane got a few feet off the ground.

The enemy immediately registered approximately two batteries of arty on our units trying to gain the river, making the advance very slow. As Co A approached the river and found the bridge over the EDER RIVER blown, Co B at 1350 was ordered to move W along the river road and secure the bridge at WEGA (H008826). Enemy dug in between FRITZLAR & WEGA coupled with observed direct and indirect fire delayed Co B in its advance. However, because of this attack from the E, a friendly unit from the W was able to secure and hold the bridge. When Co B reached WEGA it was ordered to remain there until further orders.

At 1630 Co C was ordered to cross the river E of FRITZLAR and attack the town from the NE in an effort to ease the resistance on the front of Co A. By 1900 Co A crossed the river by wading, but it was unable to advance in the face of intense small arms, mortar and observed arty fire. Co C occupied a few houses on the NE edge of town by 2200 with great difficulty facing heavy small arms and bazooka fire.

A counterattack was thrown against Co C about 0230, 31 Mar, and within a few minutes its position was surrounded. Co A was immediately given the mission to move around the E side of town and make contact with Co C. Leaving one plat to hold the bridgehead at its point of crossing, Co A moved out and gained contact with Co C at 0500. At this point both units held ground until daylight and then strengthened their positions.

Co B moved to the southern outskirts of FRITZLAR at 0700 and there reverted to Bn reserve. Upon order from CCA it was attached to the 14th Tk Bn, and moved out at 1300 to join its new organization.

The 27th Armd Inf Bn moved into FRITZLAR with the mission of relieving the 60th Armd Inf Bn, and by 1515 the relief was complete even though part of FRITZLAR N of the river had not been entirely cleared.

Upon relief the 60th Armd Inf Bn and attachments less Co B began marching toward the new assembly area in the vic of WETTESINGEN (010181). Due to darkness and heavy traffic on the roads, the column moved very slowly and was a few miles from WETTESINGEN at midnight. (See overlay No. 9).

Casualties and material losses inflicted upon the enemy by the 60th Armd Inf Bn during the period 1-31 Mar 45 are shown on the attached chart.

Section IV - No Comment.

Section V - Overlays.



K.W. COLLINS,
Lt Col., Infantry,
Commanding.

ENEMY CASUALTIES AND MATERIEL LOSSES (Continued)
EAST OF RHINE RIVER
13 - 31 MARCH 1945

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	13 - 31 TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
Killed		30		10	5					15	5	4	20		3			10	2	104	180
Wounded		120		30	18					30	18	10	60		10			30	10	336	585
Prisoners		20	41	135	200					17	33	165	207	106	300			250	190	1663	2580
Tank, Mk VI					2										4					6	7
Tank, Mk IV																		1		1	7
88 MM A. T.															3					3	12
75 MM A. T.				2																2	4
20 MM A.A.										3			7					3	3	16	20
40 MM A. A.										2			2					3		7	8
75 MM How. Towed																					3
105 MM How. S. P.																					3
105 MM How. Towed																		2		2	6
150 MM How																		1		1	1
Machine Guns		5		3	9										18			4		39	65
Prime Mover (H/T)																		1	1	2	3
Cargo Trucks															4			9		13	16
Motorcycles		3	1	5											15			4		28	32
Military Cars																		15		15	15
Supply Wagons															24					24	24
Tractors				1											1				2	4	6
Fuel Dumps															1					1	1
Airplanes																		16		16	16
Airfield																		1		1	1

